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Abstract
Using ultra-high-frequency data extracted from the order flows of 23 stocks traded on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we study the empirical regularities of order placement in the
opening call auction, cool period and continuous auction. The distributions of relative log-
arithmic prices against reference prices in the three time periods are qualitatively the same
with quantitative discrepancies. The order placement behavior is asymmetric between buy-
ers and sellers and between the inside-the-book orders and outside-the-book orders. In ad-
dition, the conditional distributions of relative prices in the continuous auction are indepen-
dent of the bid-ask spread and volatility. These findings are crucial to build an empirical
behavioral microscopic model based on order flows for Chinese stocks.
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1 Introduction
Stylized facts are common statistical characters observed from different stocks
within different time periods and usually presented in a qualitative form. Con-
cerning equity returns, the stylized facts contain the absence of autocorrelations,
heavy tails, multifractality and intermittency, volatility clustering, leverage effect,
and so on [1, 2, 3]. Many stylized facts in financial markets can be reproduced
with microscopic models. If a microscopic model presents mock stylized facts in
conformity with real ones, this model is believed to have catched some under-
lying regularities of financial markets. Based on how the price forms, there are
two types of microscopic models for financial markets known as the agent-based
models and order driven models [3]. The price variations in agent-based models
are determined by the imbalance between demand and supply, including perco-
lation models [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], Ising models [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], minority
games [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], and others [24, 25]. The price in order-
driven models changes based on the continuous double auction (CDA) mechanism
[26, 27, 28, 29]. Two fundamental ingredients of order-driven models are order
placement and order cancelation [26]. The regularities governing the dynamical
processes of order placement and cancelation can be determined empirically in
some sense. In this way, very realistic behavioral models can be constructed.
Order placement plays a key role in the simulation of price formation in order
driven models, since the proportion of placed orders is much greater than that of
canceled orders. When placing an order, the trader need to determine its sign (“+1”
for buys and “−1” for sells), size and price. In determining the order price, the
trader faces a situation of dilemma and has to balance two contradictive factors,
the certainty of execution on one hand and the potential benefit on the other hand.
Patient traders possibly consider the fact of benefit more important than the other
and place orders inside the limit-order book with a less aggressive price (high price
for sellers and low for buyers). The situation is different for impatient traders who
consider the factor of execution certainty in the first place. This kind traders want to
make a transaction as soon as possible and place the order outside the limit-order
book with a more aggressive price (low for sellers and high for buyers). In this
work, we focus on the prices of submitted orders.
Zovko and Farmer studied the unconditional distribution of relative limit prices
defined as the distance from the same best prices for orders placed inside the limit-
order book [30]. They merged the data from 50 stocks traded on the London Stock
Exchange (August 1, 1998 to April 31, 2000) and found that the distribution decays
roughly as a power law with the tail exponent approximately α = 1.5 for both buy
and sell orders. Bouchaud et al. analyzed the order books of three liquid stocks on
the Paris Bourse (February 2001) and found that the relative price of new orders
placed inside the book follows a power-law distribution with the tail exponent α =
0.6 [31]. Potters and Bouchaud investigated the relative limit price distributions
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for inside-the-book orders of three Nasdaq stocks (June 1 to July 15, 2002) and
found that the distributions exhibit power-law tails with an exponent α = 1 [32].
Maskawa analyzed 13 rebuild order books of Stock Exchange Electronic Trading
Service from July to December in 2004 on the London Stock Exchange and found
that the limit prices for all orders inside the book are broadly distributed with a
power-law tail whose exponent is α = 1.5 [33], which is consistent with the results
of Zovko and Farmer [30]. He also presented the distribution in the negative part
for more aggressive order outside the book and found that the negative part decays
much faster than the positive part. Mike and Farmer focused on the stock named
AZN and tested on 24 other stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange [26].
They found that the distribution of relative logarithmic prices can be fitted by a
Student distribution with α = 1.0− 1.65 degrees of freedom and the distribution is
independent of bid-ask spread at least over a restricted range for both buy and sell
orders.
There are also efforts to seek for factors influencing order placement. Using 15
stocks on the Swiss Stock Exchange, Ranaldo found that both bid-ask spread and
volatility negatively relate to order aggressiveness [34]. Lillo analyzed the origin
of power-law distribution of limit order prices with the method of considering the
order placement as an utility maximization problem considering three factors: time
horizon, utility function and volatility [35]. He found that the heterogeneity in time
horizon is the proximate cause of the power-law distribution, while heterogeneity
in volatility is hardly connected with the origin of power-law distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the data set analyzed
and briefly introduce the trading rules of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SSE).
Section 3 presents the unconditional probability distributions of relative prices in
three periods: opening call auction, cool period, and continuous double auction.
We then study in Section 4 the conditional probability distributions against bid-ask
spread and volatility, respectively. The last section concludes.
2 Dataset
We analyze a huge database containing the order flows of 23 liquid stocks listed on
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the whole year 2003 [36]. The order flow records
ultra-high-frequency data whose time stamps are accurate to 0.01 second including
details of every event. Each limit order can be identified by the order placement
time. The logarithmic price of an order at time t is denoted as pi(t). The tick size
of the quotation price of an order is RMB 0.01 yuan. As an emerging stock market,
with the purpose of speculation limitation and healthy development, the Exchange
imposes a daily price limit of 10% on trading of stocks, which means that the
maximum price fluctuation on trading day T must be restricted to ten percent of the
closing price p(T − 1) of the previous trading day. More details about the trading
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rules can be found in Ref. [37].
The Chinese stock market is an order-driven market with the key mechanism called
continuous double auction (CDA). Before July 1, 2006, only limit orders are al-
lowed. There are three time periods for open call auction (9:15 a.m. to 9:25 a.m.),
cool period (9:25 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.), and continuous double auction (9:30 a.m. to
11:30 a.m. and 13:00 p.m. to 15:00 p.m.). Table 1 shows the numbers of valid buy
and sell orders placed in the three periods.
3 Unconditional distributions of relative logarithmic prices
We define the relative price x as the logarithmic distance of order price from a
reference price, which is presented as follows,
x (t) =


pi(t)− pir1(t− 1) for buy orders
pir2(t− 1)− pi(t) for sell orders
, (1)
where pi(t) is the logarithmic price of a coming order at time t, pir1(t − 1) and
pir2(t − 1) are the logarithmic reference prices right before the order is placed at
time t. Roughly speaking, orders with larger relative prices x are more aggressive.
In the Chinese stock market, there is a daily price limit of 10%. If the closure price
of a stock on a trading day is p, then the price of any new order in the successive
trading day is constrained in the range [pmin, pmax] = [R(0.9p), R(1.1p)], where
R(y) is the round number of y. The definition domain of the relative price x is
[pimin, pimax] = [ln(0.9/1.1), ln(1.1/0.9)] ≈ [−0.2007, 0.2007] . (2)
Therefore, all the distribution diagrams in this work have fixed abscissa width. In
addition, no matter what the functional form of the distribution is, arbitrary mo-
ments of x exist.
In the ensuing subsections, we study the probability distributions of relative prices x
for 23 stocks in the three periods (opening call auction, cool period and continuous
auction) with different trading mechanisms. We have compared the distributions
for individual stocks and found that they are remarkably analogous. This is not
surprising since the same traders invest in different stocks which makes the order
placement dynamics underlying different stocks behave similarly. We thus treat
all the stocks as an ensemble and study the distribution aggregating all the 23-
stock data in each period. This treatment is also supported by the fact that x is
dimensionless and varies within [−0.2007, 0.2007] for all stocks.
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Table 1
An overview of order placement
Number of orders
Stock code Opening call auction Cool period Continuous auction
buy sell buy sell buy sell
000001 45,719 72,685 21,495 22,905 1,650,942 1,500,371
000002 24,098 48,296 8,898 13,017 826,806 891,475
000009 19,766 41,028 9,365 14,518 838,207 904,612
000012 8,368 18,192 5,882 6,490 463,536 437,421
000016 7,276 14,568 4,045 4,526 286,046 308,869
000021 13,239 24,387 9,265 9,935 660,818 695,660
000024 5,640 12,631 2,867 4,284 191,098 232,446
000027 13,435 35,007 5,142 9,123 467,385 670,321
000063 10,394 23,800 4,055 6,139 354,840 466,066
000066 9,532 19,860 6,272 6,768 453,067 489,532
000088 3,092 8,645 1,462 2,096 121,927 153,971
000089 9,519 19,313 3,650 4,863 297,322 303,752
000406 15,315 31,300 7,287 10,011 462,696 457,572
000429 7,045 13,505 2,888 3,369 184,443 207,910
000488 9,095 15,104 2,888 3,795 179,374 183,640
000539 5,030 13,718 2,291 3,945 179,984 170,520
000541 7,034 12,936 1,701 2,530 105,055 119,808
000550 9,936 20,427 5,828 7,504 521,182 566,326
000581 5,115 13,531 2,455 3,032 146,821 181,723
000625 12,516 23,481 6,425 8,375 555,846 582,814
000709 13,324 27,200 5,709 7,558 351,883 375,383
000720 9,536 16,433 1,382 2,673 145,797 133,175
000778 8,858 22,771 3,224 6,193 236,609 288,828
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3.1 Distributions in opening call auction
Opening call auction is held between 9:15 and 9:25 on each trading day. It refers
to the process of one-time centralized matching of buy and sell orders accepted
during this time period. At any time t, the virtual transaction price piv(t) is deter-
mined according to the following principles: (i) the price that generates the greatest
trading volume; (ii) the price which allows all the buy orders with higher bid price
and all the sell orders with lower offer price to be executed; (iii) the price which
allows either buy side or sell side to have all the orders identical to such price to be
executed. Orders are executed together at the end of opening call auction. The word
“virtual” means that the orders are not really executed and the price is disposed to
all traders. Whenever a new order arrives or an order is canceled 1 , the virtual price
is updated. However, we focus on new prices only when new orders are submitted,
which are stamped with time t. In other words, the time t increases by one step
after a new valid order is placed.
According to the definition of relative price x in Eq. (1), in the opening call auction
we have
pir1(t) = pir2(t) = piv(t− 1), (3)
where piv(t − 1) is the virtual transaction price at time t − 1. Fig. 1 presents the
probability distribution of relative prices x for buy orders (circles) and sell orders
(diamonds) in the opening call auction.
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Fig. 1. (Color online) Panel (a): Empirical probability density functions f(x) of relative
prices x aggregating the 23-stock data in the opening call auction for buy orders and sell
orders, respectively. Panel (b): Log-log plot of the probability density functions f(x) for
the positive relative prices x > 0. The solid lines are the least squares fits of Eq. (4) to the
data with αbuy = 0.13± 0.04 for buy orders and αsell = −0.31± 0.02 for sell orders. The
plot for sell orders has been vertically translated downward for clarity.
Fig. 1(a) shows that there are three local maxima in the density function f(x) for
both kinds of orders. Each f(x) function reaches the global maximum value when
1 According to the trading rules, no cancelation is allowed between 9:20 a.m. and 9:25
a.m. in the opening call auction process.
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x = 0, which means that the virtual price piv plays an important role in the process
of order placement. A large proportion (3.46%) of the orders are placed on the
virtual price to increase the execution probability. The secondary maximum locates
at negative x close to x = 0, which means that the traders are more patient: buyers
pose higher price while seller put lower price in order to lower their costs with
satisfying certainty of execution. The third maximum is close to x = 10%, the
daily price limit. In conformity with the trading rule of daily price limit, a large
number of patient traders place their orders at the lowest price (for buyers) or the
highest price (for sellers) no matter what the current price is. On the other hand,
the probability distribution of overnight returns reaches it maximum at zero. The
third maximum is thus explained based on these two facts. There is also another
significant kink around x = 0.1, which is also induced by the price limit rule.
The distribution of x is asymmetric between the orders placed inside the order book
(x < 0) and those outside the book (x > 0). The density f(x) decays more slowly
for orders inside the book. Speaking differently, more traders consider to curtail
the cost of investment and are less aggressive. In addition, the distribution for buy
orders are not the same as that of sell orders. There are more buy orders placed
close to the virtual price. The underlying mechanism for this asymmetry between
buy and sell orders are not clear.
In Fig. 1(b), we plot the probability density f(x) as a function of relative price
for outside-the-book orders on log-log coordinates. We find that each distribution
roughly follows a power law in the bulk
f(x) ∼ x−(1+α) . (4)
Linear least-squares fitting gives the power-law exponents αbuy = 0.13 ± 0.04 for
buy orders in the range 0.002 6 x 6 0.045 and αsell = −0.31±0.02 for sell orders
in the range 0.002 6 x 6 0.072.
3.2 Distributions in cool period
Following the opening call auction, cool period begins at 9:25 and ends at 9:30.
Within this period, the trading system is open to orders routing from members, but
does not process orders or cancelation. The trading system presents the information
at the first three best on each side. We term it “cool period”, because the informa-
tion including prices and volumes released by the Exchange and displayed on the
terminal screens does not change within this time period. Traders place their orders
according to those fixed reference information.
The relative price x of a new order is defined as the logarithmic distance from
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the same best price 2 . In the definition of relative price x presented in Eq. (1), the
reference prices are 

pir1(t) = pib
pir2(t) = pia
, (5)
where pib and pia are respectively the best bid and best ask which keep constant and
are independent of time t. The probability density functions f(x) of relative prices
x for buy orders and sell orders in the cool period are shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. (Color online) Panel (a): Empirical probability density functions f(x) of relative
prices x aggregating the 23-stock data in the cool period for buy orders and sell orders, re-
spectively. Panel (b): Log-log plot of the probability density functions f(x) for the positive
relative prices x > 0. The solid lines are the least squares fits of Eq. (4) to the data with
αbuy = 1.89± 0.08 for buy orders and αsell = 1.66± 0.09 for sell orders. The plot for sell
orders has been vertically translated downward for clarity.
As we can see in Fig. 2(a), the distributions are similar to their counterparts in
the opening call auction qualitatively. However, the probability at x = 0 is higher
than that in the opening call auction and the second maximum in the opening call
auction disappears. Since there are much less data points in the cool period than in
the open call auction, the f(x) functions have large fluctuations in this time period.
In Fig. 2(b), we present the distributions of the positive relative prices x > 0 on log-
log coordinates. The main bodies follow a power-law behavior with the exponent
αbuy = 1.89 ± 0.08 in the range 0.003 6 x 6 0.04 for buy orders and αsell =
1.66± 0.09 in the range 0.003 6 x 6 0.04 for sell orders.
3.3 Distributions in continuous auction
Continuous auction (9:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. and 13:00 p.m. - 15:00 p.m.) is the
main part of the trading process. It refers to the process of continuous matching of
2 The same best price is the best bid price for buy orders and the best ask price for sell
orders.
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buy orders and sell orders on a one-by-one basis. The orders not executed during
the opening call auction and placed in the cool period automatically enter the con-
tinuous auction. The execution price in the continuous auction can be determined
according to the following principles: (i) where the highest bid price matches the
lowest offer price, the deal is concluded at such price; (ii) where the bid price is
higher than the lowest offer price currently available in the central order book, the
deal is concluded at the lowest offer price; (iii) where the offer price is lower than
the highest bid price currently available in the central order book, the deal is con-
cluded at the highest bid price. The trading system shows the three best prices and
their volumes by the interaction of the limit-order book and order flow. Note that
there is no closing call auction (14:57 p.m. - 15:00 p.m.) in the year 2003, which
was effective since July 1 2006 to generate the closing prices.
The two reference prices in the definition of relative price x presented in Eq. (1) are
chosen as the same best prices:


pir1(t) = pib(t)
pir2(t) = pia(t)
, (6)
where pib(t) and pia(t) are the best bid and best ask in the continuous auction which
are variable with respect to time t. The probability density functions f(x) of relative
prices x for buy orders and sell orders are shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Panel (a): Empirical probability density functions f(x) of relative
prices x aggregating the 23-stock data in the continous auction for buy orders and sell
orders, respectively. Panel (b): Log-log plot of the probability density functions f(x). The
plots for outside-the-book orders has been vertically translated downward for clarity.
The two distributions for Chinese stocks illustrated in Fig. 3(a) exhibit very dif-
ferent behavior when compared with other stock markets [26, 30, 31, 32, 33]. The
most import idiosyncratic feature is that there exist kinks around x = ±0.1, which
is induced by the 10% price limit trading rule in the Chinese market. The second
discrepancy concerns the asymmetry between buy orders and sell orders. The dis-
tributions for both types of orders are identical in the interval x ∈ [0, 0.1], beyond
which they deviate significantly. In the interval x ∈ [−0.1, 0], the density f(x) is
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greater for sell orders than for buy orders indicating that sellers are more patient
to place orders inside the book with less aggressive prices. In contrast, there is no
significant difference between the distributions for buy orders and sell orders of
stocks on the London Stock Exchange [26, 33]. We also find that the distribution
for each types of orders in the Chinese market is asymmetric with respect to the
same best price (x = 0): there are more orders placed inside the book. This is qual-
itatively consistent with the result of Maskawa [33] but different from that of Mike
and Farmer [26].
When |x| > 0.1, three tails of the distributions decay exponentially. Compared
with Fig. 3(b), these tails look like power laws. These two descriptions can be uni-
fied since ln |x| = |x| − 1 for |x| − 1 being not too greater than 0. For aggressive
buy orders with x > 0.1, the tail distribution exhibits an abnormal upward trend.
Since there were only limit orders allowed for placement, the best strategy for an
trader who wants to have her order executed immediately is to place the order at
the highest price allowed pimax to buy or the lowest price allowed pimin to sell. This
consideration partly explain this anomaly. However, it is not clear why the anomaly
exists only for buy orders. According to this strategy, one expects to see possible
local maxima around x = 0.1 for both buy and sell orders, which is actually the
case. For patient traders, the 10% price limit rule provides a simple strategy to place
orders at the lowest price pimin to buy or the highest price pimax to sell. This strat-
egy applies especially to those traders who want to “catch the bottom” or “escape
the roof” 3 . This strategy also applied to short-term speculators who think that the
intraday price may fluctuate largely 4 .
In Fig. 3(b), we plot the two sides of each density function on double logarithmic
coordinates. Each curve decays as a power law in a certain scaling range. For the
positive relative prices, we obtainα+buy = 1.66±0.07 in the range 0.003 6 x 6 0.04
for the buy orders and α+sell = 1.80 ± 0.06 in the range 0.003 6 x 6 0.04 for the
sell orders. These power-law exponents are greater than those of the London Stock
Exchange [26, 33]. When we focus on the distributions of negative relative prices,
we have α−buy = 1.72 ± 0.03 in the range 0.003 6 x 6 0.04 for buy orders and
α−sell = 1.15± 0.02 in the range 0.003 6 x 6 0.05 for sell orders. These exponents
3
“Catch the bottom” is a terminology frequently used by Chinese traders when the market
is experiencing a severe drop for several successive days. After several days of price drop,
more and more traders will try to predict the end of the correction or crash and place buy
orders at the projected bottom. On the contrary, if the market is bullish for a while and more
and more people think that it is a bubble, traders might take the strategy to sell before the
market reverses. It is termed as escaping the roof.
4 In order to reduce the market risks and speculation actions, the Chinese stock market
adopts T + 1 trading system, which does not allow traders to sell the stocks bought on
the same day. However, T + 0 trading strategy is frequently adopted by speculators. If a
confident speculator project that the price of a held stock will fluctuate significantly, she
can buy new shares at lower price and sell held shares at higher price. The order of buying
and selling is determined by her projection of the intraday price trend.
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are comparable to the results discovered on the London stock Exchange to some
extent [26, 30, 33]. However, all these exponents are greater than those discovered
on the Paris Bourse and Nasdaq stock market [31, 32].
4 Conditional distribution
When placing orders, traders may consider other factors, such as the bid-ask spread,
volatility, limit-order depth, and so on. Here, we focus on one of the most liquid
stock (Shenzhen Development Bank Co. Ltd, code 000001, see also Table 1) in the
continuous auction and check whether the probability density function of relative
prices is dependent on the bid-ask spread and volatility, respectively.
4.1 Conditional distribution on spread
Bid-ask spread, defined as the difference between the best ask price and the best
bid price, is considered as the benchmark of the transaction cost and a measure of
market liquidity. The definition of bid-ask spread in literature varies and we adopt
the definition put forward by Mike and Farmer [26]
s(t) = ln pia(t)− lnpib(t) , (7)
whose statistical properties has been studied for the Chinese stocks [37].
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Fig. 4. Conditional distribution functions on bid-ask spread for buy orders (a) and sell
orders (b) of stock 000001.
Our test is based on the idea of Mike and Farmer, who found that the distribution of
relative prices of orders is independent of the spread [26]. For each order of price
pi(t) placed at time t, the associated spread is s(t− 1) right before the order place-
ment. The sequence of relative prices is sorted based on the associated spreads.
The data set of relative prices is then grouped into four subsets, each of them has
identical size. For each group, we calculate the empirical conditional distributions
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f(x(t)|s(t − 1)) for buy orders and sell orders, which are shown in Fig. 4. We
find that the probability density functions in the four groups for each type of or-
ders are almost the same, independent of the bid-ask spread. The test confirms the
empirical results of Mike and Farmer [26]. The result is however contrary to the
conclusion proposed by Ranaldo [34], in which the orders are classified based on
aggressiveness and the method is thus a coarse graining of the density function.
It is interesting to note that the f(x) functions corresponding to large spread (the
fourth group) have abnormal increase in the positive tail for buy orders in Fig. 4(a)
and in the negative tail for sell orders in Fig. 4(b). These phenomena can be ex-
plained partly as follows. When the spread is large, the stock price moves fast.
When the price increases, buyers is willing to execute orders immediately so that
they place orders at the most aggressive price pimax, while the sellers (say, the T +0
speculators) place orders at the least aggressive price pimin.
4.2 Conditional distribution on volatility
Volatility is a measure of asset risk in financial markets. We define the volatility as
the local average of the absolute returns
v(t) =
1
N
t∑
i=t−N+1
|pim(t)− pim(t− 1)| (8)
where
pim(t) = [pia(t) + pib(t)]/2 (9)
is the mid-price of the best ask and best bid at time t and N is the number of returns
r(t). Here we use N = 50.
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Fig. 5. Conditional distribution functions on volatility for buy orders (a) and sell orders (b)
of stock 000001.
In order to investigate whether order placement is related to volatility defined in
Eq. (8), we divide the whole data into four groups with same size and increasing
volatility. The grouping procedure is similar to that used in Sec. 4.1. For each group,
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we calculate the empirical conditional distributions f(x(t)|v(t − 1)) for both buy
and sell orders. The results are illustrated in Fig. 5. We find that the probability
density functions collapse to the same curve for both buy and sell orders, which
means that order placement is almost independent of volatility. This conclusion is
consistent with the result purposed by Lillo when he studied the limit order price
of stock AZN traded on the London Stock Exchange [35] but not in line with the
conclusion of Ranaldo [34].
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the distributions of relative prices of orders placed in the
opening call auction, cool period and continuous double auction using ultra-high-
frequency data reconstructed from the quotes database and the trades database of
23 stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange within the whole year 2003. The
results for individual stocks are similar to one another, which allows us to aggregate
all 23 stocks for analysis.
The distributions in the three time periods exhibit common properties and idiosyn-
cratic features. During the three time periods, the probability density function reaches
the maximum at x = 0, which means that a large proportion of orders are placed
on the same best price. The distributions are asymmetric between buy orders and
sell orders in each period. In addition, each distribution is asymmetric to the same
best price x = 0 and there are more orders placed inside the book (x < 0). More
interestingly, all the distributions are heavily influenced by the idiosyncratic trad-
ing rule of 10% price fluctuation limit, which induces kinks around x = ±0.1. The
distributions of large relative prices beyond the kinks decay faster than in the bulks
in exponential forms.
We have also studied the dependence of the distributions with respect to the bid-
ask spread and volatility in the period of continuous auction, taking a very liquid
stock (000001) as an example. We found that the distributions of relative prices are
independent of the bid-ask spread and volatility.
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